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REGULATORY REFORM IN THE
INTERCITY BUS INDUSTRY
Cornish F. Hitchcock*
Something is wrong with the intercity bus industry.
• In some markets, taking the bus can be as expensive, if not
more so, than flying or taking the train. 1
• Federal regulation has limited the ability of carriers to engage in direct competition or to offer innovative services and
fare options.2
• Bus service to small communities has been steadily declining
across America. 3
• Over the past decade, the financial health of the bus industry has eroded steadily, and bus ridership today lags below levels
attained in 1970:'
• Bus travel is less comfortable than flying or going by train
and a lot less popular. 5
Thus, while Greyhound's commercials may claim "it's such a
pleasure to take the bus," Trailways probably comes closer to
the mark in observing that passengers "would prefer to travel by
plane, automobile, or even truck, if given the chance, and will
pay a premium to do so."8
This troubled situation is a matter of great concern because
• Director, Transportation Consumer Action Project, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1972,
University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, Georgetown University. A different version of this Article was presented as testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation on
June 3, 1981. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and are not
necessarily the views of the Transportation Consumer Action Project.
1. See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
2. See pt. Il B infra.
3. See notes 112-20 and accompanying text infra.
4. See pt. Il D infra.
5. The 5.6 square feet of space available to bus passengers, on an average, is 60 to
.80% of the average space afforded commercial airline passengers; train passengers get 3
to 6 times as much room as bus passengers. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERCITY DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
FOR PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT 335 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
STUDY]. In addition, bus travel was the only form of transportation rated negatively by
the public in a Harris poll. Id. at 338.
6. Comments of Trailways, Inc., at 19, Entry Flexibility, Regular Route Passenger ·
Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No.
MC-133).
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the intercity bus industry constitutes a critically important
means of transportation in this country. Bus companies carry
more people each year than either the airlines or Amtrak. 7 Bus
riders consist disproportionately of the elderly, minorities, the
young, and the poor - members of the society who least can
afford to travel. 8 Furthermore, bus companies serve 14,600 communities, roughly 14,000 of which receive no other intercity public transportation; in contrast, the airlines offer scheduled service to approximately 650 points, while Amtrak operates among
550 communities. 9 Finally, as American dependence upon highpriced petroleum continues, bus travel takes on greater importance because it is the most fuel-efficient form of intercity
transportation. 10
·
Whether anything can be done to improve intercity bus transportation will depend ultimately on the industry itself, especially how it responds to shifting consumer demands. In order
for the industry to gain the flexibility needed to improve public
service, however, an important first step is congressional reform
of economic regulation of the industry. Since 1935, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") has been deciding what
firms can enter the industry, specifying the routes those firms
can serve and the permissible fares and levels of service to be
offered on those routes. Unfortunately, ICC regulation has been
unduly rigid, contributing significantly to the high fares, limited
competition, declining service patterns, and poor financial health
of the industry. The current system of economic regulation has
benefited neither the industry nor the public; it is time for a
change.
Over the past four years Congress has adopted laws to ''deregulate/' or at least reform, economic regulation of the airline,11
trucking,1 2 rail, 13 and household-goods moving industries.14 Be7. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MOST FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION
SERVICE 2 (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 ABA REPORT].
8. Id. See also E. Pinkston, The Intercity Bus Transportation Industry 132-36 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (1976).
9. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, INTERCITY Bus SERVICE IN SMALL COMMUNITIES 6
(1980) [hereinafter cited as DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY].
11. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)).
12. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11901 (West Supp. 1981).
13. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10705-10713 (West Supp. 1981).
14. Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10734, 10934, 11110
(West Supp. 1981). In non-transportation industries, Congress has adopted economic
regulatory reform laws affecting natural gas, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980), and interstate banking, Depository Institutions and Mon-
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cause these industries were subject to the same sort of economic
regulation15 as the intercity bus industry, the question arises
whether similar reforms in ICC control over bus transportation
should be made, and whether any unique attributes of the industry counsel a different approach. The inquiry is especially
timely because the United States House of Representatives has
recently passed the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981,
designed to reform ICC economic regulation of the intercity bus
industry. 18
etary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. -96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
15. This Article discusses only economic or "cartel-type" regulation of the bus industry: the ICC's determinations of what fares can be charged, what companies can serve
what routes, and which firms can enter the industry. The Article does not address safety
regulation, which presumably would continue under the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety
("BMCS") in the U.S. Department of Transportation. Earlier "deregulation" bills take a
similar approach. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 affected only the Civil Aeronautics Board's route and rate determinations for domestic airlines, without modifying
safety regulation carried out by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FM"). Similarly,
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not modify truck safety regulation by the BMCS, and
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 did not change rail safety regulation by the Federal Railroad Administration.
The distinction is important because "deregulation" is a term somewhat porous in
meaning; In the first place, cartel-type regulation of the sort traditionally practiced by
the ICC and CAB often is lumped together with health, safety, environmental, and other
"social" regulation of the sort practiced by the FM, Food and Drug Administration,
Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies. This commingling is unfortunate, because the two are fundamentally different in character. In structurally competitive industries, the former sort of regulation can stifle competition and raise prices
paid by the public, often in the name of preventing "discrimination" and preserving
"stability in the marketplace." The latter type of regulation, however, attempts to save
lives and prevent injuries through the adoption of rules and standards that force companies to internalize costs paid by the public. For instance, standards requiring a company
to decrease emissions- of air pollutants may reduce death and illness from respiratory
illriesses; compliance costs are assumed by· the company and presumably passed along to
the public, which presumably saves money it would otherwise spend on health care.
The term "deregulation" also can be misleading because, even if cartel-type regulation
is abolished for a particular industry, the industry still remains subject to tax, antitrust,
securities, environmental, criminal and other laws - all regulating business conduct. For
analytical clarity, rather than talking in terms of "deregulating" an industry, it would be
preferable to speak of "decartelizing" or replacing cartel-type regulation with "marketplace regulation" that allows the marketplace to determine what services may be offered,
what markets may be entered, and what prices may be charged. If marketplace regulation is to replace cartel-type regulation, there must be a recognition that market failures
will remain, which should be corrected. Even Adam Smith acknowledged that a tendency
towards monopoly is an inevitable part of a free market. The antitrust laws and prohibitions against-unfair and deceptive practices have traditionally been used in the United
States to correct market failures, and such antitrust enforcement must play a key role in
any conversion from cartel-type regulation to marketplace regulation. See pt. IV infra.
16. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1981).
As introduced in a different form on Mey 21, 1981, H.R. 3663 embodied regulatory reform proposals of the ICC and, along with H.R. 3662, supported by the American Bus
Association, was considered in hearings during May and June 1981. See Hearings on
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This Article will analyze the economic structure of the intercity bus industry and the type of service received by the public
under the present regulatory scheme. It will then discuss what
regulatory reforms could improve service, how these issues are
addressed in the recent House-passed bill, and what further legislative reforms should be made.
I.

THE INTERCITY

Bus

A.

INDUSTRY: AN EcoNoMIC OVERVIEW

Industry Structure

The intercity bus industry comprises 1,330 firms, which operated 21,900 buses and earned operating revenues of nearly $2
billion in 1980.17 These statistics do not, however, tell the full
story; economic concentration, particularly concentration of revenues, "is overwhelming in the bus industry."18 Of the industry's
1,330 firms, 46 large interstate Class I carriers - those earning
at least $3 million annually - accounted for 71 % of all passenger revenues in 1979.19 In 1979, the last year for which figures
are available, these large Class I carriers operated 89 % of "regular-route" passenger'miles and earned 92% of the revenues from
this service.20 By contrast, most of the roughly 1,250 smaller
Class II and Class ID carriers21 garnered much less revenue from
regular-route service than from charters and special tours22 H.R. 3662 & 3663 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the House Public
Works and Transportation Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 28 & June 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as House Bus Hearings] (because transcripts of these hearings have not yet
been printed, page citations will be to the witnesses' prepared statements).
17. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. Of these, roughly 850 are ICC-regulated
interstate carriers. H.R. REP. No. 334, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as HousE REPORT],
18. ICC BuREAu OF EcoNoMics, THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY: A PRELIMINARY STUDY
45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY].
19. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 53, table 4.
20. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CENTER, INC,, DEREGULATION OF THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY 12-13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MAC DEREGULATION STUDY]. "Regular-route" service is scheduled service offered between specified points over specified highways, and
may include stops at intermediate points.
21. Class I carriers have operating revenues in excess of $3 million annually; Class II
carriers have operating revenues between $1 million and $3 million; and Class III carriers
have operating revenues of less than $1 million. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra
note 10, at 3.
22. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 12. "Charter" service involves
transportation of a preexisting group of passengers between a common origin and destination, e.g., a bus chartered to take a football team to and from a game. "Special" or
"tour" service is similar to charter service, but the carrier forms the group, such as when
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service that constitutes only a small part of Class I carriers' op-·
erations.23 In a very real sense, then, the industry is highly segmented: Class I carriers principally provide scheduled regularroute service, while smaller companies specialize in charters and
tour service.
Among the 46 large Class I carriers, only Greyhound and
Trailways have nationwide route systems, and these two firms
dominate the industry. In 1980, they captured 81 % of Class I
carrier revenues, Greyhound earning 59 % and Trailways 22 %•24
In comparison, the third largest intercity carrier, Carolina Coach
Co., earned less than 2 % of total Class I carrier revenues in
1980.211
This great market concentration might be explained on
grounds of economic efficiency if the bus industry were charac- ,
terized by large fixed costs which would create significant economies of scale and barriers to entry.28 There exists no evidence,
however, of high fixed costs in the intercity bus industry. For
instance, depreciation and amortization comprised less than four
percent of the operating expenses of Class I carriers in 1978 and
1979,27 and new buses, the principal industry expense, cost only
about $120,000 apiece in 1981.28 Moreover, a substantial market
exists for less expensive, used buses.29
The presence of so many small bus carriers provides the most
compelling evidence, buttressed by several economic studies,30
a company sponsors a sightseeing tour for which members of the public purchase tickets.
SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 95-96. Bus companies also provide "package express"
service as part of their regular-route service in order to move small packages.
This Article will primarily discuss regular-route service. For a discussion of the other
types of services, see ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-11. See also INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMM'N, REPORT OF THE Bus INDUSTRY STUDY GROUP, chs. I, IV & V
(1979) [hereinafter cited as ICC Bus STUDY GROUP REPORT].
23. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 12. In 1979, for instance, Class Il
and III carriers earned only 8% of the revenues from regular-route service, but captured
61 % of the revenues for charters and tour services. Id.
24. Id, at 16. These figures include Greyhound Lines, Inc.'s five wholly owned Class I
subsidiaries and Trailways, Inc.'s 13 wholly owned Class I subsidiaries.
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 22.
26. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 267-69 (6th ed. 1981); E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS 345-46 (2d ed. 1975).
27. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MosT FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 29 (1980).
28. Statement of Theodore C. Knappen, Sr. Vice President, Trailways, Inc., at 9, in
House Bus Hearings, supra note 16.
29. Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, at 5, Entry Flexibility,
Regular Route Passenger Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7,
1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. MC-133).
30. See id. at 3-6; E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 15-22; Fravel, Returns to Scale in the
U.S. Intercity Bus Industry, in PROCEEDINGS - 19TH ANNUAL MEETING 551-60 (Trans-
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that there are no significant economies of scale in the intercity
bus industry. Indeed, one Department of Transportation survey
indicated that many small intercity bus companies had average
costs significantly lower than Greyhound,81 and even the American Bus Association has agreed that "small, regular route carriers can compete successfully with larger carriers."32 Thus, concentration in the bus industry cannot be attributed to economies
of scale or other market factors. Rather, the two-firm industry
dominance has been engendered by regulatory policies which
have promoted development by looking favorably on mergers
and acquisitions while discouraging new entry.

B. Industry Development
The intercity bus industry began in the early 1900's when various entrepreneurs began using "buses" - closely resembling
elongated sedans - to transport passengers throughout urban
areas, into suburbs, and beyond to other cities.88 As automobile
transportation grew in popularity, so did bus travel, and this development led to improved roads, providing further impetus to
expansion. Entry into the industry cost little, and by World War
I hundreds of very small bus companies were offering local and
regional service throughout the country.84
As the industry expanded, state regulation began, first in
Pennsylvania in 1914. Some states wanted to ensure passengers'
safety. Other states, concerned more with the wear and tear on
their highways, restricted the size and weight of motor vehicles.
By 1930, every state except Delaware had imposed some form of
regulation on bus companies. 35
State regulation had a significant impact on the industry,
portation Research Forum 1978).
Pinkston suggests, however, that there may be advantages to a large scale of operations from a marketing standpoint, especially on longer distance travel, where passengers
will wish if at all possible to stay on the same bus for the full length of the trip. Even if
such through-service is not available, a larger company benefits from size in its ability to
plan schedules to minimize layovers. Furthermore, the larger the carrier, the less likely it
will be that a passenger will have to go to a separate terminal to change buses, or to deal
with more than one company in handling tickets. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 22-25.
31. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TRENDS
& CHOICES (TO THE YEAR 2000) (1977).
32. Comments of Am. Bus Ass'n, at 9a, Entry Flexibility, Regular Route Passenger
Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No.
MC-133).
33. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 1.
34. Id.
35. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 6.
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which by 1925 had grown to 6,500 companies operating over
7,800 routes. 38 State commissions decided to treat the bus industry as a public utility or regulated monopoly37 by promoting stability as a major goal of the system. State regulators hoped to
avoid direct competition, which they thought would result in
buses operating with too many empty seats, higher costs, and
poor service ~t fluctuating rates. 38 Thus, they generally denied
entry into territories already served "adequately" by another
company - and even if existing service were found "inadequate," the incumbent carrier usually was provided the opportunity to improve service before another company could operate
on the route. 39
Given this approach, it should not be surprising that the
1920's witnessed many mergers between bus companies, because
the regulators considered carrier size to be an indicator of
financial stability and commitment to providing common-carrier
service.-•° Furthermore, the demand for expanded long-haul service compounded the trend toward concentration of the industry, as small companies, typically operating 100 miles or less,
found merger to be an easy means to meet this demand. 41 Between 1926 and 1928 alone, the number of bus companies declined from 4,040 to 3,610, even though route miles, bus miles,
passengers carried, and operating revenues all were growing."2 In
this climate the Motor Transit Corp. - the predecessor of Greyhound Lines, Inc. - was formed in September 1926, as a holding company capitalized at $10 million. 43
The Corporation grew rapidly in the late 1920's, owing to generally favorable economic factors, a capable management, and
the financial strength and complementary nature of the bus
companies absorbed into its system."" Greyhound, the name formally adopted in 1930, also took advantage of the prevailing regulatory climate, persuading state agencies to let it acquire or
control bus companies falling within their jurisdiction."5 Internal
36. Id. at 5-6.
37. B. CRANDALL, THE GROWTH OF THE INTERCITY Bus INDUSTRY 91-92 (1954).
38. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 2.
39. E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 7. See generally Jones, Origins of the Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity: Development in the States, 1870-1920, 79 CoLUM. L.
REv. 426 (1979).
40. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 2. A common carrier holds itself out to

provide transportation to all passengers on a nondiscriminatory basis.
41. Id. at 2-3.
.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
45. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 82-83.
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expansion -was facilitated further by a 1925 Supreme Court ruling that state agencies had no jurisdiction to regulate economic
activities of interstate bus companies.46
Greyhound's strategy produced handsome returns. In 1927
and 1928, the company expanded as far east as New York and as
far west as Kansas City. Within another year, it acquired authority to serve the western United States, and by 1934, it had
obtained authority to operate to points in Canada. Internal
growth, continued acquisition, and eventual consolidation into
operating divisions within the company continued for another
twenty years. 47
A number of small regional carriers sought to counter Greyhound's emerging national network by devising a system of integrated operating practices. In February 1936 they formed the
National Trailways Bus System, whose member carriers agreed
to accept each other's tickets for interline travelers, consolidate
terminals and coordinate schedules, increase joint supervision of
equipment and personnel, and adopt a common logotype for
their operations and advertising. Within this group, one company - Trailways, Inc. - became dominant, and the National
Trailways system grew into the second largest intercity bus
operation.48
The National Trailways carriers were not alone in reacting to
Greyhound's advances. Beginning in the late 1920's, state agencies pressed for federal regulation over motor carriers.49 These
sentiments drew support from the ICC, the regulator of the railroads for over forty years, which recommended in 1928 that
Congress enact a scheme of federal regulation for the bus industry.110 Congress responded in 1935 with the Motor Carrier Act,111
requiring the ICC to regulate interstate shipping rates, fares,
routes, and services offered by both trucking and intercity bus
companies.112
During the rest of the 1930's, the ICC, like the state regula46. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). See also Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S.
317 (1925). While invalidating economic regulation of interstate carriers, the Court upheld state regulation of motor carrier safety.
47. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 3.
48. Id. at 5.
49. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 83.
50. Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685, 746 (1928).
51. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10521-10529 (West
Supp. 1981)).
52. Carriers in business on June 1, 1935, were generally able to obtain an ICC certificate of operation under "grandfather" provisions of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 306(a)(l) (1976) (repealed 1978), and some 3,000 bus companies received certificates in
this fashion, SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 95.
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tory bodies before it, took a favorable stance toward mergers
and· acquisitions of bus companies as a means of fostering economic stability. Thus, "[b]y the late 1930s, the economic structure of the bus industry had essentially evolved into its present
form." 113 The carriers enjoyed substantial prosperity during
World War II, when auto travel was restricted. 11• After the war,
consolidations and mergers continued at a brisk pace, with the
number of bus companies declining from 2,480 to 1,150 between
1950 and 1960.1111 The number of vehicles in operation during the
1950's fell by 3,500, to 20,970, and passenger miles did not reach
their 1952 peak of 24.7 billion again until 1967.118 Over the past
twenty years, then, the bus industry has remained virtually stagnant, while other forms of public intercity transportation have
shown impressive gains.117
II. ICC

REGULATION OF

THE Bus INDUSTRY

A. Fares
The ICC has the responsibility to ensure that intercity bus
fares are "reasonable. "118 Bus companies embody fare changes in
"tariffs" filed with the Commission before the fares are scheduled to take effect.119 Upon complaint or upon its own initiative,
the ICC can suspend a proposed fare for seven months.80 The
ICC has authority to cancel a fare for being too low, too high,
unduly preferential, or unjustly discriminatory, and additionally
can itself prescribe a lawful rate.81
Bus companies can file tariffs either individually, or through
the National Bus Traffic Association ("NBTA"), a "rate bureau"
that serves as the tariff-publishing agent for almost 400 carriers
who combined earn nearly ninety percent of intercity bus reve53. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 3.
54. See C. TAFF, COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 496 {5th ed. 1975).
55. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 15.
56. Id.
57. Intercity travel has risen 300% since 1950, while bus miles are up only 20%, and
the percentage of regular-route passenger miles has actually dropped 33% over the past
30 years. Whereas in 1950, the intercity bus accounted for 4.5% of all intercity travel, its
share in 1979 had dwindled to 1.8%. Statement of Arthur D. Lewis, President, American
Bus Ass'n, at 7-8, in House
Hearings, supra note 16.
58. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10701{a) {West Supp. 1981).
59. Id. § 10762.
60. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708 {West Supp. 1981).
61. Id. § 10704{a)(l).

Bus

10

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

nues. 82 NBTA, though, is more than a trade association publishing tariffs on its members' behalf. Under the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act,83 NBTA members enjoy immunity from the antitrust laws
to engage in collective discussions and votes regarding fare levels
they wish to propose to the ICC for its approval. Although bus
companies remain free to file their own fare changes based upon
individual costs, prevalent faresetting practice calls for NBTA
members to discuss, agree upon, and submit to the ICC "general
rate increases" whereby all participating carriers agree to raise
their fares by a certain percentage.84
Differently put, bus companies set their fares much the same
way that OPEC members set the price of crude oil. Such price
fixing would be a per se violation of the antitrust laws for nonregulated companies, and it "obviously lessens price competition
and imposes unnecessary costs on consumers. " 85
Congress gave careful consideration to collective fixing- of
truck rates in 1980 during debate on the Motor Carrier Act. 'In
voting to end antitrust immunity for collective setting of "singleline" rates and to make certain procedural reforms in the
processing of new rate proposals in the trucking industry,88 the
House Committee on Public Works and Transportation disapproved collective ratemaking, concluding that it "inherently
tends to result in rates that will be compensatory for even the
least efficient motor carrier participating in the rate discussions.
When this happens, consumers lose the benefit of price competition. " 87 The Committee also noted a "serious problem" in the
closed nature of the rate bureau proceedings, where rate proposals are voted on behind closed doors, creating the opportunity
for rate bureau employees largely to control the process.88
Similar conclusions apply as well to collective determination
of bus fares. While the intercity bus industry has substantially
lower operating costs than either Amtrak or the airlines89 62. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89.
63. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706 (West Supp. 1981).
64. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89.
65. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATl'ORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL CoMMIS•
SION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 209 (1979). See also Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
66. A "single-line" rate is charged for transportation performed solely by one carrier
over its own route system, in contrast to a "joint-line" or "interline" rate for transportation performed jointly by two or more carriers. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(l) (West
Supp. 1981).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in (1980) U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 2283, 2309 [hereinafter cited as MOTOR CARRIER A<:r HOUSE REPORT].
68. Id.
.
69. 1981 ABA R.EPoRT, supra note 7, at 5.
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neither of which sets fares collectively with competitors - bus
fares are not substantially lower than the cost of flying or taking
the train. The failure of bus carriers to offer fares that reflect
their cost advantage over other modes of public intercity transportation severely indicts the industry's collective ratemaking
approach. Standard bus fares generally are slightly lower than
train or plane fares, but a comparision- of specific fares offered
by Greyhound, Amtrak, and the airlines demonstrates that even
this minor differential is not always in evidence.70
• Between Denver and Salt Lake City, for example, the oneway Amtrak fare is $56, compared to the one-way Greyhound
coach fare of $57.60. A one-way airline ticket costs only $60.
• On long-distance routes, the balance is even more skewed.
For instance, it costs $117 .60 for a 15-day excursion bus ticket
between New York and Los Angeles; the trip takes 47 hours, and
passengers must buy food for two days. By contrast, Capitol Airlines offers a $154 regular and a $129 standby fare, for a journey
requiring one-eighth the time.
• Finally, in a possible harbinger of things to come, a new airline, People Express, advertises air fares that are lower than bus
fares in the same markets.71
The Reed-Bulwinkle Act charges the ICC with ensuring that .
rate bureau price fixing is conducted in a manner consistent
with the national transportation pQlicy.u Not until the 1970's,
however, did the Commission adopt rules to regulate rate bureau
operations.78 This cursory approach by the ICC has two distinct
effects. First, analysts have concluded that bureau procedures
stifle competition and independent rate setting.74 This occurs
70. These fares are based on a telephone survey conducted by the author in late May
1981. See also MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 18, table ill-13. Federal
subsidies have helped keep Amtrak fares at these comparable levels, but this situation is
soon likely to change. Congress recently emphasized reducing Amtrak subsidies through
such measures as raising fares, reducing management costs, and raising productivity. See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1172, 95 Stat. 357,688
(amending 45 U.S.C. § 501a (Supp. III 1979)).
71. Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, § 10, at 2 ($59 New York-Florida fare).
72. The national transportation policy is spelled out at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West
Supp. 1981). The pertinent provision of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act is now codified at 49
U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981). Technically speaking, rate bureau members
draw up agreements on how the rate bureau will operate, and those agreements are filed
with the ICC. Once approved, the bureau operations as authorized by agreement are
immunized from the antitrust laws.
73. See Rate Bureau Investigation, 351 I.C.C. 437 (1976). See generally SENATE
COMM, ON THE JUDICIAllY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION IN
THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY: ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 84-88 (Comm.
Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as Jun1cww REPORT].
74. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 73, at 64-69.
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because the required public notice of independent rate filings
alerts the rate bureaus and deprives the carrier independently
proposing a fare of a competitive edge. Furthermore, bureaus
themselves can protest independently filed fares, even should no
carrier object to the proposal. The analysts have found the second major implication of lax ICC control over rate bureaus,
closely related to the first, to be that bureau employees, rather
than the carriers themselves, actually control the ratemaking
process. 711
If the ICC has done little to control rate bureau procedures, it
has done even less to control the end product: proposed fares.
Between 1935 and 1973, the ICC conducted only three investigations of bus fare levels. In the first two investigations (in 1951
and 1970), the Commission allowed the full increases sought,
while the third (in 1973) led to approval of a three percent increase instead of the five percent hike sought by the industry.76
It staggers the mind to imagine that over a thirty-eight-year
span only three fare hikes were deemed worthy of investigation,
and only one was found excessive.'17
For a brief period in the mid-1970's, the ICC did scrutinize
requested rate hikes more closely, and even set some proposed
increases at least partially aside.78 From 1979 through the third
quarter of 1981, however, the Commission has rubberstamped
all but one industry request for a general rate increase, paving
the way for fares to rise at least 57 % , even though carrier costs
did not rise this much and the consumer price index rose only
35% during the same period.79 Furthermore, ICC fare regulation
apparently has failed to protect rural bus users from paying
higher fares than urban bus riders; fares paid, for instance, by
75. MOTOR CARRIER ACT HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 27.
76. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 89-90.
77. See id. at 89-91; DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 12-13. This
discussion does not apply to ICC permit applications for a "contract carrier" to serve
only a limited number of customers. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10923 (West Supp. 1981).
78. See MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 4. If the ICC fails to exercise
its statutory right to investigate and suspend proposed passenger rates, see 49 U.S.C.A. §
10708 (West Supp. 1981), the rates become effective within 30 to 45 days, or sooner
under special circumstances. See DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 12;
MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 4.
79. See ICC Office of Special Counsel, Protest and Petition for Suspension and Investigation, at app. B, Increased Passenger Fares and Express Rates: Nat'l Bus Traffic
Ass'n, Suspension Case No. 70526 (ICC Sept. 28, 1981) (ICC approved seven general rate
increases from Feb. 1979 through Sept. 1981); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT 3 (Sept. 1981) (Sept. 1981 consumer price index at
279.3); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL-79-218, NEWS (March
23, 1979) (Feb. 1979 consumer price index at 207.1).
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riders in 38 small communities across America were 11 % above
the national average. 80

B. Licensing and Entry Policy
Historically, an intercity bus company has been able to gain
ICC approval to operate along specific routes in one of three
ways: (1) by applying for a certificate granting new or expanded
authority; 81 (2) by obtaining a certificate under the "grandfather" provision of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act;811 or (3) by merging with or acquiring control of an existing carrier, or purchasing
an ICC certificate from another carrier.83 This discussion will focus upon applications for authority, the most important means
whereby new carriers can enter the industry and existing companies can expand their routes and services.
1. The statutory standard and early interpretations- In order to obtain an ICC certificate for new or expanded operating
authority, an applicant must prove first that it is "fit, willing,
and able"84 to provide the transportation while obeying ICC
rules, and second that the service "is or will be _required by the
present or future public convenience and necessity."811 This standard has been rigidly interpreted by the ICC to prevent the entry of any new competition that could cause existing carriers to
lose revenue along the route in question. In the seminal case of
Pan-American Bus Lines Operation, 86 the ICC set forth a standard designed to ensure that new operating grants would not impair the financial stability of existing carriers. Under this standard, the ICC would evaluate "public convenience and
necessity," for purposes of granting a new operation or service,
according to three factors: (1) whether the proposed transportation would "serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public
demand or need"; (2) whether existing service could adequately
meet this public purpose; and (3) whether the proposed new operations or service would "endange[r] or impai[r] the operations
80. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D
SEss, INTERCITY Bus SERVICE IN SMALL COMMUNITIES 4 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY).
81. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922 (West Supp. 1981).
82. 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1976); see notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
83. If one carrier wishes to merge with or acquire control of another carrier, it generally must receive prior 'approval from the ICC. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11343 (West Supp. 1981).
84. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(a)(l) (West Supp. 1981).
85. 49 U.S.C.A .. § 10922(a)(2) (West Supp. 1981).
86. 1 M.C.C. 190 (1936).
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of existing carriers contrary to the public interest. " 87 Thus, ICC
policy has placed gr_eat emphasis on preventing diversion of revenues from incumbent carriers, thereby limiting passengers'
ability to choose between competing companies.88
·
Promoting the financial stability of corporations that perform
useful public services may have been an appropriate federal policy objective during the Depression, but thirty years later, with a
robust economy, the ICC still fretted over "duplication" of service and the impact which competition could have on the balance sheets of existing carriers. For example, in 1965 the Commission expressed concern that proposed new service between
Boston and Rochester would allow two companies to compete
directly, albeit over different routes, adding that "such a result
is not looked upon with favor unless the evidence shows a need
for the additional service, without any material harm to existing
carriers. " 89
2. Recent entry policy- Starting in the mid-1970's, the ICC
adopted a series of reforms designed to liberalize this restrictive
entry policy for motor carriers of both passengers and freight
traffic. Perhaps the most significant shift in approach came in
1979 with a policy statement modifying the forty-three-year-old
Pan-American test for judging route applications. While the
Commission retained the requirement that the proposed operation "serve a useful public purpose responsive to a public demand or need," it reversed the presumption - implicit in the
Pan-American approach - against extensions of service, stating
that operating authority consistent with the public purpose
would be granted "unless it is established by parties opposing
the application that the entry of a new carrier into the field
would endanger or impair operations of existing common carriers to an extent contrary to the public interest." 90
During the same period, the Commission used two proceedings involving the Liberty Trucking Co. to erect high barriers to
87. Id. at 203.
88. For instance, in one 1938 case the ICC allowed New England Greyhound Lines to
buy the property and operating rights of some smaller regional lines. The Commission
noted that the acquisitions would "promote economical operation" by eliminating "much
duplicate and wasteful mileage. In 1936 the departure times of applicant and vendors
coincided with seven schedules. Applicant proposes to eliminate such duplication, thus
obtaining a higher load factor." New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 15 M.C.C. 536, 540
(1938).
89. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 101 M.C.C. 410, 414 (1965).
90. Policy Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,296 (Oct. 19,
1979), review denied sub nom. Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 635
F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1980).
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protestants alleging diversion of revenues. No longer would it be
adequate for a carrier protesting an application for new service
to show "mere evidence of revenues it may lose to [the] applicant." Rather, a protestant would be required to demonstrate
"why or how authorization of a competitive service will lead to
substantial traffic diversion and material revenue loss" at such
levels that "the new competition is likely to materially jeopardize existing carriers' ability to serve the public. " 91 Differently
put, a protestant essentially would have to prove that a grant of
new authority would cause serious harm not only to the affected
route, but systemwide.
In addition to these substantive changes, procedural reforms
were enacted to help streamline ICC proceedings. As a means of
simplifying applications for new · authority and reducing the
filing of frivolous protests, the Commission limited the automatic right to intervene in licensing cases to those carriers with
a stake in the outcome. Protests could be lodged only by carriers
that had authority to provide the service in issue, or that had
offered to serve the community in question during the past
twelve months.92
These ICC initiatives provide carriers with their best opportunity in years to obtain new authority. In previous times, though,
the ICC has favored existing carriers - principally Greyhound
and Trailways - at the expense of smaller and newer companies, not to mention the public. Between 1960 and 1970, the ICC
considered only 130 new authority applications and denied a significant number: 36 % of the regular route and 44 % of the charter applications. 93 Between 1975 and 1977, the ICC received only
49 bus applications, mostly for scheduled regular-route service.
Of these, 33 came from companies other than Greyhound or the
Trailways system. Yet the ICC ·granted only 33 % of the applications from smaller companies, while authorizing nearly 88% of
the Greyhound and Trailways requests. 94 Between 1976 and
91. Liberty Trucking Co., 130 M.C.C. 243, 245-46 (1978), review denied, 131 M.C.C.
573 (1979); review denied sub nom. Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States,
629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980).
92. Protest Standards in Motor Carrier Application Proceedings: Special Rules, 43
Fed. Reg. 50,908 (Nov. 1, 1978), modified, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,277 (Dec. 27, 1978), aff'd sub
nom. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Congress adopted this standard in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.A. §
10922(b)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1981), while the regulation's current version is at 45 Fed.
Reg. 86,792 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § U00.252(d)(5)).
93. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 97.
94. Financial Condition of the Intercity Motor Bus Industry: Hearings Before the
Stibcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977).

Journal of Law Reform

16

[VOL. 15:1

1978, the Commission received only 84 applications for regularroute authority. Only five c~e from new companies, and all of
these were granted; most others caine from companies seeking
modest extensions of existing authority, a strategy designed to
minimize opposition from incumbent carriers. 911
Given the low economic entry barriers in the industry, and the
thousands of small carriers that existed before and after the imposition of federal regulation,98 it is beyond question that "in
the absence of ICC regulation, more carriers would have entered
the industry or expanded their operations."97 While ICC policy
has relaxed slightly in recent years, the difficulties involved in
obtaining new authority still are so great that, according to the
American Bus Association, a growing number of bus companies
are offering new service without ICC approval, making the number of passengers being illegally transported a significant percentage of total traffic.98

C. Exit Policy and Adequate Service
1. Legal framework- The ICC creates substantial difficulties
for carriers desiring to operate new routes, yet does little to preserve service that it does license, despite the general policy notion that exit should be restricted in regulated industries to ensure the provision of service.99 Bus companies can leave a
market by (1) filing an application with the ICC,1°0 (2) simply
stopping service in anticipation that there will be no protest, or
(3) reducing service to a point where it becomes so inconvenient
that no one travels by bus. Although carriers frequently drop
service, 101 the available evidence suggests that ICC procedures
frequently are bypassed. The ICC itself has candidly admitted
that under the present system "formal action with regard to interstate regular route service is limited to the handling of situations after the fact," 102 and a 1977 study prepared for the Department of Transportation found "no significant [number of]
applications to discontinue interstate regular route service.mos
95. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 10.
96. See notes 17-42 and accompanying text supra.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 97.
Comments of Am. Bus Ass'n, supra note 32, at 10.
See
PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 79 (rev. ed. 1969).
49 U.S.C.A. § 10925(b) (West Supp. 1981).
See notes 112-20 and accompanying text infra.
ICC Bus STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 22, at 37.
DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 11.

c.
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Thus, formal ICC mechanisms for controlling exit policy apparently have played only a marginal role in preventing the discontinuation of service by authorized carriers. 104
The most effective barrier to exit has been the insistence of
state regulatory bodies that a bus company continue to serve the
intrastate portion of an interstate route, even when the ICC has
authorized abandonment of the interstate route. 105 While such
policies have short-term consumer benefits, they also produce a
balkanized transportation policy under which a federal agency
permits certain service to end while a state agency requires part
of that service to continue.108 The result seems contrary to the
congressional goal of a national transportation policy.107
Even restrictive state exit policies, however, cannot ensure the
provision of good service. Bus companies can effectively exit
from a market, even though nominally offering service, simply
by dropping frequencies or scheduling their departures and arrivals at such inconvenient hours that service deteriorates. A
downward spiral follows; as service worsens, ridership declines
even further. 108 Although the ICC does have legal authority to
regulate the adequacy of bus service,109 regulations in this area
were not adopted until 1977, and those dealt mostly with consumer protection issues110 and did nothing to regulate schedul104. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 104; SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra
note 80, at 8.
·
·
105. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 24-27, 53-55.
106. See statement of Marcus Alexis, Acting Chairman, ICC, at 15, in House Bus
Hearings, supra note 16; SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 8.
107. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 (West Supp. 1981); cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp. 101 S.Ct. 1309 (1981) (Iowa statute that limited operation of twin trailers in Iowa
struck down as a burden on interstate commerce; all surrounding states permitted- twin
trailers to operate within their borders). See also NATIONAL TRANSP. POLICY STUDY
CoMM'N, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICIES THROUGH THE YEAR 2000, at 248 (1979).
108. SENATE STUDY, supra note 5, at 104. By allowing service to deteriorate, the incumbent carrier still remains in a position to add new frequencies if traffic increases, and
also can protest new entry by another carrier. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note
10, at 12.
. 109. 49 U.S.C.A. § lll0l(b) (West Supp. 1981).
110. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1063 (1980). Even if viewed as consumer protection rules, the ICC
rules are paltry, particularly when compared with the protections available for other
modes of travel For example, the ICC limits bus company liability for lost or damaged
luggage to $250 per passenger, a sum which cannot begin to compensate a passenger for
the ordinary contents of two suitcases. The limits for Amtrak and domestic air travel, by
contrast, are $500 and $750, respectively.
Furthermore, airline and Amtrak passengers have long been able to purchase excess
value coverage to increase the carrier's liability for lost or damaged luggage. In 1979, the
ICC proposed a rule to let bus passengers obtain such coverage, effective January l,
1980. Before the rule took effect, however, the ICC bowed to an industry request to
postpone the effective date. It took the Commission 16 months before the rule was reissued, with an effective date in May 1981. The industry once again asked for a delay,
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ing or to prescribe minimum service levels. Thus, while intercity
bus carriers may operate among 14,600 communities across
America,m that figure gives no accurate indication of the quality
of service provided.
2. Small community service- One of the philosophical underpinnings of the ICC's "tight entry, tight exit" policy is the need
to protect and ensure service to small communities across
America. The theory, traditionally applied in a ·public utility
context, posits that service between major points is profitable
enough to "cross-subsidize" unprofitable service to small and rural points which would go unserved if the carrier were not compelled to serve profitable and unprofitable routes alike. 112
this time for 90 days (or until after the peak summer season had passed), and once again
the ICC granted the request. See Practices of Motor Common Carriers of Passengers Checked Baggage Liability Provisions, 132 M.C.C. 560, effective date deferred, 46 Fed.
Reg. 27,343 (1981) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1064.1). See generally DOT SMALL
COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 13.
111. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
112. It has been suggested, somewhat more persuasively, that there are crosssubsidies between charter, special, and package-express service, on the one hand, and
regular-route service, on the other. To the degree such subsidies exist in a regulated
environment, they would probably exist in a less regulated environment as well, without
affecting the quality or availability of service to rural communities.
For example, the argument has been made that charter and special services have been
more profitable than regular-route service. See E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 29-33. This
may occur because such services can he operated more efficiently, in that it is easier to
concentrate on the most lucrative markets and to operate such services with a higher
percentage of seats filled.
Until 1967, the ICC automaticaliy awarded charter and special-tour authority when it
awarded regular-route authority, and it was not unusual for companies to apply for the
latter in order to obtain the former supposedly "incidental" authority. See ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 10. Although carriers were obligated to perform regularroute operations in order to keep their charter and tour authority, the ICC deemed onceweekly service sufficient in this regard. Id. In 1966, however, Congress amended the law
to eliminate this practice and to require that applicants for charter and special authority
request and prove the need for this service separately. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 10932(c) (West
Supp. 1981).
Thus, some carriers today find themselves forced to operate regular-route service in
order to maintain authority for charter and tour services. But for these carriers, running
a limited amount of regular-route service should not be burdensome, because the marginal cost of operating such service, over and above their profitable charter and tour business, should he fairly low. So long as regular-route revenues exceed the marginal costs of
offering such service, such operations make economic sense and would not necessarily be
discontinued in a less regulated environment. Service that turns a profit, albeit a lower
profit than other service, is not truly "subsidized," and likely would be continued under
a deregulated regime.
Several other factors suggest that cross-subsidization between types of service is not
crucial to maintaining adequate levels of rural service. In the first place, Class I carriers
concentrate on regular-route service, while smaller carriers focus on charters and tours.
In 1980, charters and tours accounted for only 14.6% of Class I carrier earnings, and
78% of all charter and tour revenues were earned by carriers other than Greyhound and
Trailways. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 53. This high degree of segmentation sug-
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This approach, however, has not worked in the bus industry
- either in theory or in practice. Little empirical evidence can
be discovered to suggest that certain routes cross-subsidize
others, or that rural .points would go unserved but for ICC regulation. In the first place, it is virtually impossible, from an analytical standpoint, to tell which routes cross-subsidize each
other.U 3 Second, a major element of traditional public utility
regulation - forced service to rural points - is absent in the
intercity bus industry. The laxness of ICC exit policy places few
practical restrictions on companies wishing to abandon or reduce
unprofitable service. 114 It is probable that bus companies serve
routes not because of ICC compulsion, but because ·the service
makes economic sense by feeding rural passengers onto longhaul routes or otherwise fitting into a carrier's overall route
network. 1115
gests that charter service is only a small part of regular-route carriers' business, and
there is no hard evidence to suggest that it keeps them operating on otherwise unprofitable routes.
In addition, it has been suggested that package express is more profitable than regularroute service. While that may be true, it does not indicate a true cross-subsidy, because
the two services cannot be severed. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-10.
Package express necessarily moves on a bus carrying passengers; thus the two services
are more appropriately considered in tandem.
113. ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 9-10. The complexities of finding
cross-subsidies are formidable. The Senate study neatly summarized the methodological
problem:
Consider, for example, a hypothetical bus line from the small community of Elkton, Md., through Wilmington, Del., to Philadelphia, Pa. Suppose that on a typical bus run 10 people ride the full route from Elkton to Philadelphia, two ride
only the Elkton-Wilmington segment, and 20 ride the Wilmington-Philadelphia
segment. If the route segments are viewed separately, the Elkton-Wilmington
segment, with just 12 passengers, look [sic) unprofitable, while the WilmingtonPhiladelphia segment, with 30 passengers, seems considerably more lucrative.
Yet, if the bus company were to drop its Elkton-Wilmington service - assuming
it could obtain approval by the regulatory authorities to do so - it would risk
losing the 10 passengers on the Wilmington-Philadelphia run who embarked in
Elkton. Because they would have to find alternative service from Elkton to Wilmington to catch the bus there, these passengers would be inclined to switch
modes for the entire trip, if that were feasible. The Wilmington-Philadelphia
segment would be left with only 20 passengers, which at best would be only marginally profitable. Thus, it frequently does not make sense to disaggregate a
transportation system into its component parts in attempting to determine the
profitability of different routes. In this hypothetical case, the company must decide whether its overall profit position is better with or without the unprofitable
segment. The complexity of this determination grows exponentially with the
number of towns served; even with the aid of the largest, newest computers, the
cross-subsidization issue is a difficult one to resolve.
SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 18-19. See also E. Pinkston, supra
note 8, at 13-62; ICC PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 18, at 93-96.
114. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
115. This has, in fact, been admitted by a Greyhound executive, who said that "a
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Despite almost fifty years of pervasive regulation, the network
of rural service in this country forms a patchwork quilt. 116
Roughly 23 % of all communities in the country that have a population between 2,500 and 10,000 receive no direct bus service
under the current regulatory regime, although effective service is
available to all but 9 % of these communities after taking account of service to points less than 10 miles away. 117
The quality and quantity of this service, however, can vary
widely. Some communities receive daily service, some receive
less than daily service, and some receive no service at all. 118 One
study of service patterns to 38 small communities across
America found the median number of departures each week to
be 50 passengers, ranging from a low of 3 to a high of 800. Arrivals also averaged 50 passengers per week, with a range of 3 to
900, although most tended to be under 105.119
The ICC's failure to assure service to small communities is
hard to overstate. During the 1970's, the Commission allowed
bus companies to abandon service to over 1,800 communities
across America.120 Bus companies have been dropping service,
on an average, roughly at the rate of 15 towns every month over
a ten-year period. When coupled with the ICC's restrictive entry policy, which keeps new companies out, this regulatory
scheme cannot be said to have provided good bus service for the
people of rural America.
good many" of the company's unprofitable routes would be continued under less regula•
tion "because they are good feeders . • • or they fit into the route structure in other
ways." Pace, Talking Business, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1981, at D2, col. 1.
116. Bus service to Breezewood - a community of 2,500 people in south-central
Pennsylvania - cogently illustrates the lack of a cohesive pattern in rural bus transportation. Breezewood stands at the junction of three major highways and is used by Greyhound as a key stopping point on the carrier's east-west routes. As a result, over two
dozen bus routes service Breezewood daily. In contrast, halfway between Pittsburgh and
Breezewood on U.S. route 30 is the town of Ligonier, also having a population of 2,500.
Ligonier receives bus service only on Friday, when two buses leave for Pittsburgh and
one returns. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 15.
Admittedly, some communities may not enjoy improved service as a result of regulatory reform in the intercity bus industry. If this indeed occurs, though, it would result
from market forces in the deregulated environment rather than the inefficiencies of ICC
regulation.
117. DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 3.
118. Id. at 15.
119. SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 5.
120. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 22;· DOT SMALL COMMUNITY
STUDY, supra note 10, at ii.
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D. The Financial Health of the Industry Under the ICC
Regime
The combination of OPEC-style price hikes, restrictive entry,
and declining service may explain why passengers are flocking to
the airlines, Amtrak, or their automobiles, and consider taking
the bus only as a last resort. Historically, the ICC has been generous to existing carriers at the expense of the traveling public,
but ironically, that generosity has not translated into a
financially healthy industry. In 1979, the president of the American Bus Association spoke of the "long term erosion of [the bus
industry's] viability,"121 and the statistics bear him out. The industry's operating ratio - operating expenses as a percentage of
operating revenues - worsened from 90.1 in 1970 to 93.1 in
1980,122 and between 1971 and 1977 return on equity declined
from 16.1% to 8.4%. 123 From 1968 to 1978, the bus industry's
net operating revenues plummeted 38 %, while passenger miles
on Class I regular-route travel decreased 15%, and the number
of passengers fell 27 %•124 The only exceptions to this downward
trend came in 1974 and 1979-1980, when soaring energy prices
and the scarcity of gasoline led consumers to take the bus in
increasing numbers; nonetheless, bus ridership is less today than
it was in 1970.1211 This bleak picture makes clear that ICC regulation of the intercity bus industry serves the best interests of
neither the public nor the industry; the time for a change has
come.

Ill.

PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

This Article's central thesis is that the traveling public, not to
mention the carriers themselves, would benefit from the substitution of marketplace competition for ICC-cartel regulation of
the intercity bus industry. As a general proposition, this substitution would require four major changes in present federal regulation of the bus industry. First, there must be an end to antitrust immunity for collective setting of bus fares and rates, a
121. AMERICAN Bus Ass'N, AMERICA'S MosT FUEL EFFICIENT PASSENGER TRANSPORTA·
TION SERVICE 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 ABA REPORT].
122. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 52.
123. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 13.
124. 1979 ABA REPORT, supra note 121, at 29.
125. 1981 ABA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at D1,

col. 3.
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step that would promote greater price competition. Second,
there must be open entry for all "fit, willing, and able" bus companies - those that can meet federal safety and insurance requirements - to allow carriers to operate any type of service
over any route without first seeking ICC permission. Third, ICC
exit policy must be reformed to require carriers seeking to leave
a market to notify the affected communities, enabling them to
search for a replacement carrier or to make arrangements for
keeping the incumbent on the route. While this would constitute
more regulation over exit than the ICC exercises presently, it
should be seen as a transitional device designed to aid smaller
communities and could be phased out as new carriers surface to
provide additional bus service. Finally, to promote uniformity in
the system, there must be federal preemption over the intrastate
portions of interstate service, if not full preemption of all state
control over intrastate service.
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981, passed recently by
the House of Representatives, makes some reforms along these
lines but does not go far enough. The Act abolishes antitrust
immunity for the collective setting of some fares, but carriers
still can collectively set "general rate increases" that raise fares
industry-wide by a fixed percentage. With regard to entry, carriers must still go through cumbersome ICC proceedings every
time they want to add a new route, although the standards could
make it somewhat easier to obtain this new authority. The bill
makes no change, however, in the Commission's current lax policy on exit, and state regulation of the industry is preempted
only to the extent that carriers can appeal to the ICC if a state
agency makes an adverse ruling on the intrastate portion of an
interstate route.
Thus, greater efforts at reform are needed. The following sections will propose and explain detailed recommendations for reform in the key areas of fares, entry, and exit, will comment on
the impact of such reforms upon rural service, and will analyze
the provisions of the recent House-passed bill in each of these
areas.

A. Fares
1. Collective ratemaking- Congress shoajd, effective immediately, repeal antitrust immunity for collective discussion and
voting on bus fares, including general rate increases. Such collective price fixing has significantly boosted fares to the public, and
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over the past forty-six years the ICC has proven itself unable to
monitor fares effectively. 126 Considering the disparity between
the unit costs of individual carriers,127 it makes no sense to allow
the setting of uniform rates that do not reflect each carrier's
costs.
Such a reform would replace overt price collusion with price
competition, to the benefit of the public. In this area, the Housepassed bill makes some reforms, notably by ending, effective
January 1, 1984, antitrust immunity for collective setting of
"single-line" fares - those offered by single carrier operating
between two points. 126 This would end the most blatant type of
horizontal price fixing; for example, Greyhound and Trailways
could no longer agree on the fare each would charge for service
between New York and Washington. Beginning January 1, 1984,
the House-passed bill also limits immunity for "joint-line" fares
- those offered by two or more companies for connecting service between two points. Under this provision, carriers would enjoy antitrust immunity to discuss and set joint-line fares only if
each could individually "practicably participate" in offering the
service in question. 129
While the House-passed bill thus goes further than the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980,iso it is still deficient in its treatment of
ratemaking because it continues antitrust immunity for general
rate increases. This is a significant omission, in light of the industry tradition and preference for across-the-board general rate

a

126. See text at notes 75-80 supra.
127. See E. Pinkston, supra note 8, at 15-16. Pinkston's study, drawing on 1972 data,
found that average costs per bus-mile ranged from $0.45 to $4.10, and that the variation
was not correlated with output. Of the 72 carriers surveyed, 39 had average costs between $0.60 and $0.80 per bus-mile. Interestingly, Greyhound's average cost was on the
high side, at $0.86 per bus-mile. Id. at 17-18.
A more recent analysis, performed by the Council on Wage and Price Stability and
based on 1978 d_ata, surveyed the costs per bus-mile of 43 Class I carriers and found a .
range from $0.90 to $3.70 per bus-mile. Again, there was no correlation between this
extreme variation and output: 31 carriers had costs below $1.40, and 12 carriers (including Greyhound) had costs above that level. Comments of the Council on Wage and Price
Stability, supra note 29, at 4.
Even among the industry giants, there are disparities in costs. In the first quarter of
1981, Greyhound's total operating expense was $1.986 per bus-mile, a figure 12% higher
than Continental Trailways' cost of $1.7666 per bus-mile. ICC Office of Special Counsel,
Protest and Petition for Suspension and Investigation, supra note 79, app. B, at 4.
128. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b)(4), 127 CoNG. REC. H8595 (daily ed.
Nov. 19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3)(E)).
129. Id; see notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
130. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 ends immunity for collective setting of single-line
truck rates on January 1, 1984. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1981). Immunity continues, however, for discussions and voting on joint-line rates and general rate
increases.
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hikes, the staggering level of ICC-approved rate hikes, the dominance of regular-route service by only two firms, and the fact
that carriers can seek fixed-percentage increases in fares despite
wide disparities in their costs. Elimination of antitrust immunity
for the setting of general rate increases, thus requiring individual fares to be tailored to specific carrier costs, would greatly
benefit the public.
2. Zone of pricing freedom- The House-passed bill creates a
zone of pricing freedom within which individual fares can be offered without the risk that they will be suspended by the ICC as
"unreasonable. msi The zone extends as high as ten percent
above and twenty percent below the rate in effect one year earlier. In addition, the ICC is given authority to extend, for the
public benefit, the upper and lower limits of this zone by ten
percent should it find actual and potential competition sufficient
to control fares. 132 All rates within the zone of pricing freedom
are subject to the antitrust laws and must be filed individually,
not as a result of collective action. 183
While a zone of pricing freedom can benefit the public by
keeping the ICC from blocking innovative or competitive fares,
such a zone must be carefully crafted and linked to the degree of
actual and potential entry which would be available to keep
rates in line. The House-passed bill fails to do this; it allows too
much upward pricing flexibility too quickly, without enough new
entry. Under the House provision, fares could increase as much
as forty-four percent in two years. 13' Given the two-firm dominance in the industry, reasonable limits on upward pricing flexibility must be maintained in the short term. If existing entry
regulation is not relaxed significantly, the very real possibility
arises that bus companies will try to boost fares higher than they
would otherwise - and without the spur of new competition to
keep fares in line.
A better approach, taken in the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,1315 would link upward pricing flexibility to new entry. That
131. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § ll(a), 127 CONG. RBc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new para. 4 to 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)).
132. Id. (adding new para. 5 to 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d)).
133. Id. § ll(b) (applying 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d}(4) to bus fares).
134. Suppose the fare in effect on the date of enactment of this hill was $20. H a
carrier takes advantage of the 10% upward zone and the ICC has, in addition, authorized an additional 10% zone on top of that, the fare could go up 20%, to $24. That $24
would then be the base for increases in the second year, and another 20% hike could
raise the fare to $28.80 - 44% above the-level two years earlier.
135. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered §§ of 49 U.S.C. (Supp.
III 1979)).
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Act set a baseline for judging the reasonableness of air fares,
which the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") was directed to adjust at least twice yearly for inflation. 138 The statute created a
zone of pricing freedom five percent above and fifty percent below the baseline, within which fares could not be suspended as
"unreasonable"187 - although for the first three years the CAB
was directed to make route awards under less stringent standards188 and procedures.139
· The Act was careful to allow full entry freedom before giving
the airlines significant pricing flexibility. After December 31,
1981, the CAB loses authority to issue to financially "fit, willing
and able" carriers certificates that specify the routes to be operated.140 Only a full year after losing control over entry will the
Board be deprived of all power to suspend or reject fares as
unreasonable.141
This format is preferable because it assumes that distortions
in carrier route systems fostered by regulation may have produced reservoirs of monopoly power that could take three to
four years for market forces to correct. By phasing in entry freedom before pricing freedom, Congress limited the ability of air
carriers with monopoly power in particular markets to exploit
their advantage by raising prices to unreasonable levels while
knowing that, as a: practical matter, new entry was unlikely in
the short term. 142 In contrast, the House-passed bill for deregu136. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 37(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (Supp. III 1979)
(amending Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d)).
137. Id.
138. . Instead of being "required by" the public convenience and necessity, new service
merely had to be "consistent with" the public convenience and necessity. Id. § 8, 49
U.S.C. § 1371(d)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979) (amending Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)(l)(A)).
In addition, the burden of proving inconsistency with the public convenience and· necessity was shifted to protestants. Id. § 14, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (Supp. III 1979) (adding new
para. 8 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)). Airlines were also allowed to enter one new
route each year without first obtaining CAB approval. Id. § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)
(Supp. III 1979) (adding new para. 7 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)).
139. Procedures were streamlined for airlines wishing to operate "dormant" authority
issued to but not used by another airline. Id. § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (Supp. III 1979)
(adding new para. 5 to Federal Aviation Act § 401(d)). Before this reform, airlines could
successfully protest applications to serve routes where they were authorized to operate
but were not doing so.
The Act also streamlines route cases by allowing written submissions to be used extensively instead of oral hearings. Id. § 21, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. III 1979) (adding Federal Aviation Act § 401(p)). Finally, the Act removes "closed door" restrictions which
prevented airlines from discharging passengers at intermediate stops on a flight. Id. § 16,
49 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. ill 1979) (adding Federal Aviation Act § 401(e)).
140. Federal Aviation Act§ 1601(a)(l)(A), 49 U.S.C. § 155l(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
141. Id. § 1601(a)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2) (Supp. ill 1979).
142. The Airline Deregulation Act attempted to minimize such short-term profiteer-
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lating the bus industry does not tie pricing freedom to entry.
The bill grants an immediate ten-percent zone of upward pricing
freedom, even though entry still will be determined on an expensive and time-consuming case-by-case basis. Moreover, notwithstanding the ·connection between pricing flexibility and entry
freedom, a ten-percent upward zone is overgenerous, given that
many routes are served by only one carrier, and that two companies dominate regular-route service.
The best approach in this area would be for Congress to end
route regulation immediately, while implementing a scheme of
increased pricing flexibility. This pricing scheme should establish as baseline fares those in effect one year earlier, and should
create a statutory zone, reaching five percent above and fifty
percent below the baseline, within which fares cannot be suspended as "unreasonable."148 The ICC should not have authority
to after the upper boundary· of this zone,144 and all ICC control
over rates should cease four years after enactment. During the
four-year transition period, carriers would remain· free to seek
fare changes falling outside th_e zone, which would have to be
justified as •~reasonable." The four-year period would allow carriers to take advantage of entry reforms to rationalize their route
systems in ways that could lead to a more competitive system,
justifying the subsequent removal of federal controls over intercity bus fares.

ing, in contrast to air.cargo deregulation legislation passed one year earlier. See Pub. L.
No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (codified in scattered §§ of 49 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979)). The
cargo law decontrolled rates upon enactment, but barred new entry into the industry for
one year. Id. §§ 17(a), 18, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1388(a)(3), 1482 (Supp. III 1979) (adding Federal
Aviation Act § 418(a)(3), and amending id. § 1002). Not surprisingly, the existing cargo
carriers promptly boosted their prices, and Congress was careful not to put the cart
before the horse a second time. See Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on H.R.

11145 Before the Subcomm." on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1978) (testimony of CAB Chairman Alfred E.
Kahn). See also Impact of Airline Deregulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.' on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54-55 (1979) (statement of CAB Chairman Marvin S. Cohen).
143. These are the limits created by the Airline Deregulation Act. See Federal Aviation Act § 1002(d)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1551(d)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
144. The Airline Deregulation Act gives the CAB authority to change the downward,
but not the upper, limit under the Federal Aviation Act, ·§ 1002(d)(7), 49 U.S.C. §
1482(d)(7) (Supp. III 1979). By contrast, the ICC can -adjust both the upper and lower
limits of the zone of pricing freedom for truck rates. 49.U.S.C. § 10708(d)(2) (West Supp.
1981).
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B. Entry
The public interest would best be served if Congress were to
end, effective immediately, ICC regulation over entry into markets and over decisions regarding the kinds of services to be provided in those markets. The ICC properly should retain only the
role of requiring new companies to prove they are financially
"fit, willing and able" to provide whatever type of bus service
they choose to offer. 145 No sound economic reason exists for obligating a bus company to undergo cumbersome ICC procedures
every time it seeks to add communities or services to its route
structure.
1. The entry barrier presented by ICC procedures- The
major flaw of the House-passed bill is its requirement that the
ICC continue issuing new authority on a c~e-by-case basis.
Every time a carrier wants to expand operations, no matter how
modestly, it must apply for and receive permission from the
ICC. ICC _procedures can themselves be a major entry barrier,
particularly for small companies, and may explain why so few
companies apply for new authority. An applicant for new authority must pay a $350 filing fee, 148 and probably a minimum of
$1,000 for the necessary assistance of counsel. Even should no
protests be filed, the Commission may determine that the applicant has not demonstrated sufficient public need for the new
service and thus deny the application in part, if not entirely. If,
however, a carrier does protest, or if the Commission decides to
require oral hearings, the bill for legal fees increases while the
chances of success diminish. Furthermore, disgruntled protestants still can go to court if an applicant is successful before the
ICC, consuming more time and money, and possibly depriving
the public· of new service in the interim.147
145. The House-passed bill adds a statutory gloss to the definition of "fit, willing and
able" by stating that the term "includes, among other things, financial fitness, operation•
al fitness, and safety fitness." H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CoNG. REc.
H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(7)). To promote safety, §
18(b) of H.R. 3663 sets minimum insurance levels of $5 million for vehicles with a capac•
ity of more than 15 passengers and $1.5 million for vehicles with a capacity of 15 passengers or less. The Secretary of Transportation may, after a rulemaking proceeding, cut
those levels in half, but only for a two-year transitional period. In addition, § 22 of H.R.
3663 would amend 49 U.S.C. § 10925(d) to let the ICC, upon request of the Secretary of
Transportation, suspend the certificate if the Commission finds that such carrier has
been "conducting unsafe operations which are an imminent hazard to public health or
property."
146. 49 C.F.R. § 1002.2(d), pt. 1(3) (1980).
147. Evidence in bus licensing cases tends to consist of statements by members of the
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Such a system can deter all but the most affluent, the most
determined, or the most litigious, and it should come as no surprise that the ICC receives only a handful of bus applications
each year. 148 In fact, the impact of present procedures in deterring new entry can be seen clearly in the industry's response to
an emergency order issued by the ICC in mid-1979 as a reaction
to the Iranian oil embargo and subsequent gasoline scarcity.149
The Commission allowed bus companies to initiate service that
summer to any point they chose, simply by filing a form. During
the three months that the interim procedures were in effect, the
ICC received half as many applications for new authority as it
had received in the previous three years. 1110 This actual experipublic either that (1) existing service is poor and if new service were allowed, the individuals supporting the application would use it, or (2) existing service is adequate and
would be impaired if new service were authorized. It is hard to imagine how such state•
ments are helpful to the ICC in predicting whether new service should be authorized,
and it is even harder to imagine the usefulness of having that testimony presented at an
oral hearing, subject to cross-examination. As the Commission observed:
The very nature of [evidence in bus licensing cases] is that it will be generalized.
The testimony is often given by laymen, the service needed is nonrepetitive in
nature, and often includes leisurely travel for which a future need or commitment cannot directly be stated.
We see little reason to subject unsophisticated passenger witnesses to extensive cross-examination in routine cases merely to drive home a point the Commission has recognized for years - the nature of passenger travel is such that
even rather unspecific predictions by potential users are difficult.
Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,771, 86,783 (Dec.
31, 1980) (ICC Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43)).
The difficulties - and expense - of such proceedings are illustrated in a recent decision in which Greyhound challenged an application by Trailways Tamiami to operate
between Atlanta and Orlando. Tamiami obtained 423 public witnesses in favor of the
new service, and Greyhound lined up 390 opponents. After a 19-day hearing at which 327
of these witnesses testified, an ICC board granted the application. Another year was consumed by Greyhound's appeal to the full Commission, and yet another year by Greyhound's unsuccessful court appeal. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. ICC, [1981) F'Eo. CARR. REP.
(CCH) 11 82,956 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 1981).
148. See notes 93-98 and accompanying text supra. For example, during July 1981,
the ICC published 1551 applications in the Federal Register for authority to operate as a
motor carrier of freight, compared to only 79 applications for passenger authority. Of
these latter applications, 44 were for regular-route authority, 1 sought charter authority,
and 34 were for authority as a broker.
149. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,810 (1979).
150. See Comments of U.S. Dep't of Transportation, at 4, Entry Flexibility, Regular
Route Passenger Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 1,434 (comment time extended Jan. 7, 1980) (ICC
Ex Parte No. MC-133). See generally Comments of the Council on Wage and Price
Stability, supra note 29, at 7-9.
New services proliferated during this period. Greyhound carried 190,000 passengers on
9 new routes, Trailways hauled 3,800 riders over 5 new routes, and at least 11 other
carriers began new service. Furthermore, diversity and innovation abounded for service
to small and large communities alike. For example, Jack Rabbit Lines started service to
Onida and Agar, South Dakota, whose populations were respectively 689 and 142. Latin
Express began service aimed at Spanish-speaking passengers between points in Florida
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ence with an open entry regime suggests that ending ICC entry
controls, except for inquiries into fitness, would be the most effective and speediest method of injecting new competition into
the industry, providing the public with new service, including
service to rural America, and giving bus companies the operational flexibility to realign route systems in the most economically rational way.
2. Reforms in entry policy made by the House bill- As
noted, the House-passed bill does not go this far, for it still requires carriers to apply for new authority and prove fitness every
time they want to add new service. Nonetheless, the bill does
provide some substantial reforms of present practices. Current
ICC procedures place an affirmative burden on applicants to
prove that new service is "required by the present or future public convenience and necessity."m The House-passed bill eases
this burden by: (1) replacing the "public convenience and necessity" criterion with a "public interest" standard,1 112 which the
committee report indicates is to be "interpreted as a lower barrier to entry than the 'public convenience and necessity' test"; 1113
(2) requiring only that the proposed service be "consistent with"
public convenience and necessity, rather than "required by"
such public purpose; and (3) shifting the. burden of proof to
protestants, in effect creating a presumption that approval of
new service is in the public interest. 1 u Protests against applications for new authority can be made only by carriers that actually serve the market or that would otherwise be affected directly by the application; 11111 furthermore, the Commission can
award new authority merely on a showing of fitness, without regard to "public interest," when a point is not receiving bus service or the new authority would replace abandoned service. us
and the Northeast. Town Tour Fun Bus Company offered new luxury service - featuring meals, stereo, and card tables - between Orange County, California, and Las Vegas.
Id. at 8-9.
151. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(a)(2) (West Supp. 1981); see 45 Fed. Reg. 86,771, 86,776,
86,789-93 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100.251-.252).
152. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(l)) (authorizing the Commission to grant a
certificate to fit, willing and able carriers unless it finds "on the basis of evidence
presented by any person objecting to the issuance of the certificate, that the transportation to be authorized by issuance of the certificate is not consistent with the public
interest").
153. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
154. Id.
155. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(8)).
156. Id. (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(5)).
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While these reforms thus track the provisions of the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 with respect to freight,1 57 they make one important step forward. Although the Motor Carrier Act shifted
the burden of proof to protestants with respect to "public convenience and necessity," applicants for new trucking authority still
must make some showing that the new service would "serve a
useful purpose, responsive to a public demand or need. " 158 As a
practical matter, this requires applicants to obtain affidavits of
support from shippers, receivers, trade associations, public officials, or others in order to get approval for authority from the
ICC. 1119 The House-passed bill places no such requirement on applicants for new bus service - an important step, because contested bus route cases in the past usually have involved battles .
between bus company lawyers in developing batteries of members of the public to support or oppose the application,180 even
though such evidence had little practical value to the
Commission.181
3. Potential negation of the House-passed entry reformsWhile the reforms discussed thus far offer the potential for easier entry into the industry and onto specific routes, that potential could be negated if the Commission adopts narrow interpretations of the very vague statutory language such as "public
interest" or "fit, willing and able." Several provisions in particular could be interpreted to make the burden of proof .easier for
protestants asserting that the proposed new service would divert
revenues or traffic away from them in a manner contrary to the
"public interest." The House-passed bill states that diversion of
revenues or traffic from incumbent carriers shall not by itself be
sufficient to deny an application. 182 Nonetheless, the application
may be denied if issuance "would impair, contrary to the public
interest, the ability of the [incumbent] carrier to provide a substantial portion of the regular-route passenger service which the
carrier provides. " 183
Viewed in its most favorable light, this provision codifies the
Liberty Trucking standard,1 " which allows companies to protest
successfully if they can show that the proposed service threatens
157. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, § 5 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 10922).
158. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(b)(l) (West Supp. 1981).
159. MOTOR CARRIER Ar:r HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 14.
160. HouSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 29.
161. See note 147 supra.
162. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(3)).
163. Id.
164. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
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not merely their continued operation on the route in question,
but rather their continued existence. Approached from this per- ·
spective, the provision represents a salutary means for protecting small carriers from Greyhound, while allowing such carriers
to expand. After all, allowing Greyhound to serve a route could
conceivably destroy a smaller carrier, while the converse seems
highly unlikely: granting a small carrier authority to compete
with Greyhound on a particular route may hurt Greyhound in
that market, but would not threaten Greyhound's continued
existence.
The danger remains, however, that this language will not be so
narrowly construed. The committee report states that this provision will prevent regular-route carriers from being "crippled by
new applications who apply for excessively narrow grants of authority designed to 'skim' the most lucrative traflic."1811 Similarly, the bill instructs the ICC to consider as pertinent to the
"public interest" whether granting the application would have
an impact on small communities,186 and the committee report
suggests that applications could be denied if the new authority
would siphon off lucrative traffic that subsidizes less profitable
small-community service.187 In addition, the ICC is supposed to
consider "any significant adverse impact" that granting an application would have on commuter bus operations; 188 again, the
committee report suggests that incumbents could successfully
protest on the ground that new charter service would diminish
peak-hour traffic and force cutbacks in commuter service.189
4. The bill's solicitude for small carriers and rural serviceThese provisions are a far cry from open entry for all fit carriers.
By allowing incumbents to argue that new service would permit
"cream skimming," the House bill assumes the existence of
cross-subsidies between various routes, a questionable assumption in light of available evidence.170 Moreover, the bill seems to
assume that small carriers need protection against larger carriers
- particularly Greyhound - even though the American Bus Association has stated that smaller bus companies can compete
successfully with larger companies171 and even though smaller
165. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
166. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(4)(B)).
167. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
168. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(l), 127 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(4)(E)).
169. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
170. See notes 112-15 and accompanying text supra.
171. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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companies appear to have lower average costs than Greyhound.172 According to one survey, the estimated average expense per bus-mile for Class I carriers was $1.40 in 1978, compared to only $1.00 for Class II and m carriers. The significance
of this disparity becomes apparent upon examination of 58
routes identified by Trailways as unprofitable. The average loss
per bus-mile stood at $0.44, with a range from $0.09 to $1.28,
suggesting that a number of "loss" routes in fact could be serviced at a profit by lower cost carriers, obviating the need for
subsidies.173
These data suggest that no need exists for denying applications out of fear for injury to smaller carriers or service to rural
communities. By specifically sanctioning protests on these
grounds, the House-passed bill should strengthen the hands· of
incumbent carriers and, by making the applications process
more expensive, may deter applications for new authority. These
data also indicate that an open-entry policy for all fit carriers
would be the best antidote for poor service, particularly to rural
America. A small regional carrier can probably provide good service at lower cost than larger national carriers, and in addition,
may have the commitment to serving the region and a specialized knowledge of its needs. In fact, one study of service to rural
communities found that in the short term "service to small
towns seems no more threatened than that to larger cities. In
fact, based upon the available financial data, it appears that the
industry is healthier in rural areas than in highly urbanized areas. "17• Companies operating in the Southwest, which tends to
be rural, showed greater profitability than firms in the more urbanized North Atlantic States,1715 . and service at many small
Southwestern communities was so frequent that abandonment
seemed unlikely if exit policy were also revised. 178 Another study
of service in Florida, where economic regulation ended abruptly
and totally in July 1980, showed that free entry had caused no
apparent harm to smaller firms; fifteen carriers other than Greyhound or Trailways were surveyed, and eight felt very strongly
that they would or already had improved their market positions
because of new opportunities provided since the end of intrastate regulation. 177
See notes 30, 31 & 127 and accompanying text supra. .
DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 37.
SENATE SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 80, at 35.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 22.
177. Statement of Marcus Alexis, Acting Chairman, ICC, at 7, in House Bus Hear-

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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C. Exit
Exit policy should be reformed to recognize that intercity bus
travel forms part of a national transportation system and should
be treated as such. Federal preemption of intrastate routes and
rates is needed, not to enable federal regulation to replace state
regulation, but for the purpose of allowing federal non-regulation to displace state regulation. At the same time, sound exit
policy would recognize the legitimate, useful role that state and
local governments can play if a community or region is
threatened with the loss of service.
The House-passed bill does not wholly preempt state exit regulation of intrastate routes. 178 Instead, it requires that bus companies continue to seek approval from state regulatory agencies
before either dropping entirely the intrastate portion of interstate service or reducing the frequency of such service to less
than one trip per weekday. 179 If the state agency denies the application or fails to act within 120 days, the carrier can appeal to
the ICC.180 Local parties can object to the discontinuance of service,181 and the bill directs the ICC to honor those protests if it
finds that discontinuance or reduction is "not consistent with
the public interest" or that continuing the service would not
constitute an "unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. " 182
The House-passed bill makes no change in the current law on
ings, supra note 16. See generally Interstate Commerce Comm'n, Commission Studies of
Florida Motor Carrier Deregulation: An Interim Report 3-9 (April 1981) [hereinafter
cited as ICC Fla. Deregulation Report].
178. In the area of exit, there is limited preemption of fares and entry on the intrdstate portions of ICC-authorized interstate routes. The carrier must still seek approval
from the state regulatory agency, but H.R. 3663 would let the carrier appeal adverse
decisions to the ICC if the request is denied or not decided within a certain period of
time. In the entry area, the House-passed bill could be used to eliminate so-called
"closed door" restrictions which block intrastate service. For example, a carrier may
serve the Boston to Cleveland route, with intermediate stops at Rochester and Syracuse,
but be unable, because of state regulation, to carry local passengers between Rochester
and Syracuse. Section 6 of H.R. 3663 would add a new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(2) to allow
appeals to the ICC if requests to serve such intrastate legs are denied by the state
agency. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17 at 33-34.
Section 17 of H.R. 3663 would amend 49 U.S.C. § 11601 to enable the ICC to overturn
state rate decisions on such intrastate legs as well, in response to complaints from the
industry that state agencies keep the fares on these legs below fares on interstate legs of
similar distance. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 21-27 & 44-46.
179. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(a), 127 CoNG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(a)).
180. Id.
181. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(c)).
182. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 10935(e)).
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exit from interstate routes, which can be accomplished simply
by filing an application to amend the certificate granting the
authority. 188
An earlier provision of the House-passed bill, proposed by the
ICC, offered a better approach to exit reform. That proposal
would simply have preempted state regulation of exit on intrastate portions of interstate routes, 184 and required the ICC to
adopt a notice and substitution procedure for dealing with a
proposed abandonment of either interstate or intrastate service.185 Under this procedure, a bus company wishing to discontinue service would be required to give notice to the ICC, the
pertinent state agency, and the affected communities.188 Such
notice would be intended to let the affected parties make arrangements to retain the service, find a substitute carrier, or
make plans for the abandonment.
Under the ICC's proposal, service could be abandoned if no
protest were filed, but a protest received within thirty. days
would require the carrier within fifteen days to furnish the ICC
and any protestants with an estimate of additional revenues or
subsidies needed to continue service, along with supporting data
on traffic, revenue, and other information needed to calculate an
adequate subsidy level. 187 Thereafter, the carrier could abandon
service within thirty days unless (1) the ICC found further investigation to be needed in order to decide if the incumbent or
another carrier could continue the service or (2) the carrier received an offer of financial assistance, presumably in the form of
a differential operating subsidy.188 In the latter case, if the carrier did not accept the offer within another thirty days, the
Commission could either allow discontinuance or order the carrier to continue operations for another sixty days. If no agreement was reached by the end of that sixty-day period, the bus
company could then discontinue service.189
The ICC's suggested approach has a number of desirable fea183. 49 u.s.c. § 10925 (Supp. m 1979).
184. Section 14(b) of H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Seas: (1981), as originally proposed
by the ICC, would have added a new 49 U.S.C. § lllOl(d) to prohibit states from regulating discontinuance or scheduling of service along interstate portions of interstate
routes. In addition, § 15(b) of that version would have amendetl 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b) by
setting minimum standards that state regulatory agencies must follow if they wish to
retain authority to regulate intrastate levels of passenger fares and express rates.
185. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1981) (adding 49 U.S.C. § lllOl(d), (e)).
186. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 11101(e)(2)).
187. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(3)).
188. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(4)).
189. Id. (adding 49 U.S.C. § 1110l(e)(5)).
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tures. First, it forces the ICC to take a more active role in monitoring abandonment of service. Second, it prevents abrupt and
total cessation of service, and - when viewed in conjuction with
the open entry reforms suggested in this Article - allows the
substitution of new carriers that may offer better service than
the existing carrier. Finally, it gives state and local agencies,
which are closely attuned to local transportation needs, the opportunity to find a substitute carrier or to pay for local service
that cannot be economically justified but which local groups believe should be continued. Nine states presently support intercity bus service through direct subsidies,190 and several states
operate or fund specialized bus service for people with particular
needs such as the elderly or the handicapped. 191 In addition,
Congress has authorized a grant program for transportation assistance in rural and sinall urban areas,192 although the cost
structure of bus firms may in fact make such subsidies unnecessary as a practical matter.198
IV.

ANTITRUST AND THE INTERCITY

Bus

INDUSTRY

The antitrust laws curb anticompetitive activities in all industries not subject to ICC-type economic regulation. Any proposal
for reducing ICC control over the bus industry must consider
whether, in light of the skewed industry structure engendered by
regulation, the antitrust laws could suffice to curb anticompetitive ·conduct in the industry should it be immediately deregulated.194 Perhaps Greyhound's dominance would enable it to
take advantage of deregulation and drive smaller companies out
of business through monopolistic practices.195 Perhaps smaller
companies would be better protected - and competition thus
enhanced - if, at least for a transition period, Greyhound were
subject to certain regulatory restraints on anticompetitive prac"
190. MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, at 25 (California, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnestoa, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia). See generally DOT SMALL COMMUNITY STUDY, supra note 10, at 34-35; ICC PRELtMINARY STUDY,
supra note 18, at 101-04.
191. Statement of William L. McCracken, Sr. Vice President, Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
at 11-12, in House Bus Hearings, supra note 16.
192. Federal Public Transportation Act of 1978, § 313, 49 U.S.C. § 1614 (Supp. m
1979).
193. See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra.
194. See note 15 supra.
195. For a detailed statement of these concerns, see Comments of '!'railways, Inc.,
supra note 6, at 37-143.
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tices that would extend beyond the protections afforded by the
antitrust laws against anticompetitive practices.
The answer to these legitimate concerns is that the antitrust
laws - enforced through private lawsuits and by federal agencies - can be relied upon by Congress as a full substitute for
ICC control over the intercity bus industry. Small bus companies can compete with the giants because of their generally lower
costs and because the industry lacks the characteristics of a natural monopoly. 198 Absent federal regulation, the intercity bus industry would exist in a structurally competitive organization and
should be subjected to the antitrust laws in the same fashion as
"nonregulated" firms. The fears of overreaching by the largest
carriers appear to be unwarranted on purely economic grounds.
That smaller carriers have little to fear in the way of monopolistic behavior is suggested by the experience in Florida, where
all regulation of intrastate bus operations ceased in July 1980.197
Greyhound has not monopolized service, and indeed, smaller
companies perceive deregulation as a significant opportunity for
expansion.198 Similarly, fears were expressed during debates on
the Airline Deregulation Act that the trunk airlines would
swamp the smaller companies, but in fact, the regional airlines
are prospering while their larger competitors are losing market
shares. 199
Immediate reliance upon the antitrust laws represents the
best way to ensure a maximum of competition along with vigorous strictures on anticompetitive behavior. As an alternative,
however, Congress could phase-in full reliance on the antitrust
laws by maintaining, at least for a few years, certain express restrictions on carrier conduct, particularly that of Greyhound.
Such an alternative approach would respond to the concerns of
smaller carriers that feel threatened by their larger competitors,
giving them a transition period within which to realign their
route structure and position themselves in the marketplace. The
drawback of such a plan, though, is its maintenance of restrictions on the ability of larger carriers to respond to public need in
situations that might force some smaller companies out of business. Moreover, the Florida experience suggests there is no such
need to protect smaller companies from predatory or anticompe196. See notes 26-32, 127 and accompanying text supra.
197. See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 177 supra & 230 infra.
199. See AIRLINE DEREGULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 91-157, 213-34 (J. Meyer &
C. Oster eds. 1981). See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE CHANGING AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A STATUS REPoRT THROUGH 1980, at 26 (CED-81-103) (1981).
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titive activities.
Against this background, then, consideration can be given to
specific anticompetitive activities that Greyhound might engage
in by exercising its monopoly power. This will involve evaluation
of how such conduct would be regulated under the antitrust
laws, and what sort of short-term restraints Congress might seek
to enact or retain if it preferred to defer immediate reliance on
the antitrust laws.
A.

Setting Predatory Fares or Rates

Defining a predatory fare is difficult at best,200 and discussions
of predatory pricing in case law and the literature have suffered
from the "failure to delineate clearly and correctly what practices should constitute the offense, and exaggerated fears that
large firms will be inclined to engage in it"; allegations of predatory pricing often ignore "the possibility that the alleged
predator's cost is ... more than covered by his price."201 Areeda
and Turner posit that .predatory pricing makes economic sense
only if (1) the putative predator has greater financial staying
power than its competitors and (2) the predator has substantial
chance that its losses will be exceeded by the profits to be
earned after the competition is destroyed. 202
In the intercity bus industry, where fixed costs are relatively
low and entry barriers could be significantly reduced by regulatory reform, it is doubtful that Greyhound could engage in predatory conduct. This seems particularly true if, as the evidence
suggests, Greyhound's costs are higher than its smaller competitors. 203 Even if Greyhound were to force out a competitor on a
particular route through cut-rate pricing, the ease of entry under
a deregulated environment would make it very difficult for Grey200. For example, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 2(a)(2), defined "predatory" 83 "any practice which would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws 83 set
forth in [the first § of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976))." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(35)
(Supp. III 1979).
201. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited
83 Areeda & Turner]. See also Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 HARv. L. REV, 869 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing:
A Reality, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REv. 901 0976). For a fuller discussion of destructive competition, see
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 198-206
(1970).
202. Areeda & Turner, supra note 201, at 698.
203. See note 127 supra.
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hound to avoid new competition that would siphon off potential
monopoly profits. Moreover, considering that Greyhound faces
the possibility of new competition not just on a few routes, but
throughout its system, it seems highly doubtful that predatory
pricing would or could make economic sense for Greyhound for
any sustained period.204 Clearly, some smaller companies could
be hurt should Greyhound cut its prices. However, simply lowering fares to meet competition need not violate the antitrust
laws205 - and indeed could have substantial public benefit - so
that a general fare reduction might still be legal under the antitrust laws if Greyhound earns a profit.208
Because predatory pricing likely would not emerge absent ICC
controls, there seems no need to provide a special remedy for
smaller bus companies. If, however, Congress wishes to retain
transitional protection in this area, the ICC could be authorized,
upon compliant or its own initiative, to suspend, investigate, or
cancel fares as predatory, even if they fall within the zone of
pricing freedom. This approach was taken in the House-passed
Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981,207 as well as both the Airline Deregulation Act208 and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.209

B. Entering a Market and Driving Out a Competitor
If ICC entry controls for fit carriers were ended immediately,
as this Article recommends, Greyhound would not violate the
antitrust laws simply by entering a new route, even if the incumbent withdrew. Similarly, Greyhound could have a "monopoly"
on a route that would not necessarily be illegal and might even
benefit the public, for example, by establishing through-service
on a single carrier. It seems unlikely, moreover, that a court reviewing a monopolization claim would consider a single city-pair
route or even the surrounding region to be the relevant market,
204. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 201, at 698-99. In recent congressional testimony, Greyhound called predatory pricing in the bus industry "foolish, if not suicidal."
Statement of William L. McCracken, Sr. Vice President, Greyhound Lines, Inc., at 34, in
House Bus Hearings, supra note 16.
205. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
726 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
206. See Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
207. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11, 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1981) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 10708).
.
208. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d)(4) (Supp. Ill 1979).
209. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708(d)(4) (West Supp. 1981).
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absent more egregious conduct on the part of Greyhound. 210
Under an open entry regime, some "bridge carriers" likely
would be absorbed into larger companies or would decide to go
out of business, but this would not necessarily be contrary to the
public interest. Bridge carriers are usually small companies providing direct service between two points, while entry restrictions
under ICC regulations often required a larger carrier to operate
between those points only in a longer, more circuitous way.211
Artificially reserving such direct service to bridge carriers does
keep smaller companies in business, but it obviously can make
travel more difficult and time-consuming for passengers who
would be forced to switch to a bridge carrier to obtain the most
direct route between two points.
As a transitional measure, Congress could limit open entry by
Greyhound·- and possibly Trailways as well - by allowing
smaller companies to file protests under the Liberty Trucking
standard:212 Greyhound could be denied a route if its entry
threatened to drive the incumbent out of business. This ap- .
proach presents servious drawbacks if maintained in effect for
too long, because it could prevent Greyhound, or Trailways,
from developing efficiencies that would benefit the public. The
House-passed bill could be narrowly construed as allowing the
Liberty Trucking standards of protection, although the bill's
language creates the risk that new authority could be denied on
other less appropriate grounds as well. 213

C. Refusing to Cooperate With Competitors
1. Interline Service- Bus companies traditionally engage in a
210. In light of Greyhound's national route network, national fare system, and national planning, it can be argued that the relevant market for monopolization claims in
intercity bus service is national under the doctrine of United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 575 (1966). Even with a national market, however, there may be regional
submarkets in which violations occur. For example, a three-state region was the area in
which anticompetitive conduct was found to exist in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound
Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S.
322 (1978).
211. This was the situation in Mt. Hood Stages v. Greyhound, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978), where Mt. Hood
was a "bridge carrier" operating direct service between Klamath Falls and Biggs, Oregon,
while Greyhound operated more roundabout service that would have caused passengers
to ride 110 more miles on a San Francisco-Spokane trip than if they switched to Mt.
Hood. For a discussion of the special situation of bridge carriers, see ICC Bus STUDY
GROUP REPORT, supra note 22, at 34-35.
212. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 163-69 and accompanying text supra.

40

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:1

variety of cooperative activities designed to facilitate passenger
travel. For example, they offer "interline" service, allowing passengers to make connections between routes that may not be
served by one carrier. Such interlining is facilitated if carriers
lease their terminal space to others, quote each other's fares, and
make scheduling information about other lines available to passengers. Given the nature of intercity bus transportation, in a
deregulated environment such practices would in all probability
be continued voluntarily, for economic reasons·, particularly if
carriers realign their route structures to achieve greater efficiencies. Suppose, for example, that in a less regulated environment
Greyhound's route system and high cost structure make it advisable to concentrate on long-haul markets and to drop marginal
or short-haul service, which presumably would be picked up by
lower-cost regional carriers. Greyhound would then be more dependent on the passenger "feed" provided through these smaller
companies, so that its own economic interests would dictate voluntary interlining.
If, however, Greyhound refused to interline, an affected carrier could receive monetary and injunctive relief under the antitrust laws - provided that Greyhound were acting with an anticompetitive purpose and had the power to originate a
substantial amount of traffic at the points in question. So the
court held in Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp.,214
where Greyhound tried to drive a competing carrier out of business by, inter alia, refusing to interline. Moreover, the conclusion that Greyhound could violate the antitrust laws by refusing
to interline is consistent with other decisions requiring a firm
with requisite market power to refrain from using that power to
preserve or extend its market share.215
214. 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 437 U.S.
322 (1978).
215. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (utility's
refusal to wholesale power·to or allow the use of transmission lines by municipal distributors found violative of the Sherman Act); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951) (refusal by sole newspaper in area to accept advertisements from retailers also
advertising with competing radio station held illegal); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (refusal to supply wholesaler with goods at
other than retail prices held unlawful); United States v. Klearfiax Linen Looms, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (refusal by sole manufacturer of material to sell to distributor so that distributor could compete for government contract held a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act).
Thus, Greyhound's use of its dominant market power to bar a competitor from the
market by refusing to deal might be a violation of the antitrust laws. See Crew, Do Antitrust Laws Provide a Feasible Alternative to Regulation?, 47 ICC PRAc. J. 673, 681
(1980).
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An alternative to immediate reliance on the antitrust laws to
ensure adequate interlining would be retention of that portion of
the Interstate Commerce Act making interlining mandatory for
bus companies. 216 Indeed, the House-passed bill does not alter
bus companies' obligations to construct through-routes and joint
fares. This approach guarantees the continued existence of interline service, which often makes economic sense217 and will
likely be provided in any event, particularly if large carriers emphasize longer routes and rely on smaller carriers to operate
"feeder" service.
2. Terminal access- Access to Greyhound terminals by competing carriers raises related problems, because interlining requires that passengers be able to catch connecting buses quickly
and conveniently. The fear has been expressed that Greyhound
might attempt to deter interlining or steer passengers toward its
own service by limiting access to its terminals.218
This problem is somewhat more difficult than questions of interlining, particularly because bus terminals, unlike airports, are
privately owned and are subject to legitimate space limitations.
Various decisions, however, suggest that the antitrust laws obligate Greyhound to make its terminals available to competing
carriers. Under the "bottleneck theory" of antitrust liability,219
"a business or group of businesses which controls a scarce facility has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access to
it."22° For example, in United States v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 221 Greyhound and other bus companies operated a terminal used by a small, local line. The local line was
evicted from the bus terminal after it arranged with another carrier to offer competing interstate service. While the district court
acknowledged that Greyhound had no obligation to accept any
carrier as a tenant, nonetheless the eviction of the local bus line,
motivated by anticompetitive animus, was found to be a violation of the antitrust laws. 232
216. 49 U.S.C. § 10703(a)(3) (Supp. ill 1979).
217. See text following note 213 supra.
218. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 49.
219. See Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d
1372, 1387 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980).
220. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979).
221. (1953) Trade Cas. 68,355 (N.D. Okla.).
222. See also Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (wholesaler tenant's eviction from building
owned by other wholesalers in most convenient location held unlawful); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912) (carriers' prevention of competing carrier's
use of railroad terminal held violative of Sherman Act where geographic constraints fun.
ited city to only one station); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (asso-
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Thus, case law clearly suggests that Greyhound has a duty to
deal with its competitors on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory
basis in allowing them to use terminal space, and can be liable
for failure to do so. Indeed, by the terms of a 1957 consent decree that ended an antitrust suit brought by the Justice Department, Greyhound is enjoined from discriminating against "a bus
operator, using a terminal owned or controlled by [Greyhound]
in the provision of usual terminal services and facilities . . . including, but not limited to, the sale and issue of tickets, the
routing of passengers, and the dissemination of travel
information. " 223
While terminal access for smaller carriers may be adequately
ensured by the antitrust laws, the problems presented by access
to competitors' facilities deserve thorough examination. The
House-passed bill directs the Secretary of Transportation and
the ICC to investigate the ownership, location, and adequacy of
bus terminals in providing passenger service.224 This study
should be highly useful in determining what steps, if any, Congress should take in this area. It may well be true that the 1957
consent decree - combined with the "bottleneck theory" of antitrust liability - adequately protects smaller carriers. On the
other hand, there may be the need for a mandatory access provision of the sort that already exists for the railroads. 2211 At this
stage, more information is needed.
3. Proscription of unfair practices under the Interstate Commerce Act- Aside from refusing to interline or barring competitors from terminals, Greyhound might engage in other anticompetitive actions, such as routing traffic around a bridge carrier to
drive it out of business, refusing to quote an interlining carrier's
fare, or arranging schedules to preclude connections. While such
actions may be an illegal refusal to deal, upon a proper showing
of Greyhound's dominance and anticompetitive purpose, they
may also be proscribed under a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act requiring that a "practice related to transportation or
service provided by a carrier ... must be reasonable." 228 Although broadly worded, the ICC could use this section more vigorously to prosecute and deter "unfair or deceptive practices or
unfair methods of competition" in the same way those practices
ciation's bylaws restricting competitors of members from membership found unlawful).
223. United States v. Greyhound Corp., [1957) Trade Cas. 73,086, 73,089 (N.D. Ill.).
224. H.R. 3663, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26, 127 CONG. REc. H8595 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1981).
225. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 11103 (West Supp. 1981).
226. Id. § 10701(a).
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are proscribed for "nonregulated" industries by section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 227 As part of full deregulation,
Congress could transfer to the FTC the authority to regulate
such anticompetitive practices in the intercity bus industry, creating a remedy · for small carriers injured by any unfair
practices. 228
CONCLUSION

Deregulation of the intercity bus industry will go a long way
toward improving service to passengers. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1981, passed recently by the House of Representatives, makes some changes but does not go far enough. If anything, this is one area where Congress could start catching up
with the states. In July 1980, Florida became the first state to
end public utility-style intrastate regulation of transportation
companies, and the voters of Arizona overwhelmingly approved
a similar approach in November 1980.229 Although the Florida
experience is too new to draw any definitive conclusions, an ICC
study reported in April 1981 that: (1) Greyhound and Trailways
had increased their total weekly scheduled miles by eight and
seven percent, respectively; (2) carriers were experimenting with
new fare options; (3) charter service had improved, and bus
companies were using their equipment more efficiently; and (4)
where service losses occurred due to shifts in regular-route service, either another carrier entered the market, another carrier
remained in the market, or another carrier was providing service
to a nearby community.230
ICC regulation of the intercity bus industry developed during
the 1930's, when assuring the :financial stability of American
227. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
.
228. In this connection, it should be noted that private antitrust litigation, while expensive and time-consuming, is always available. In the leading case of Mt. Hood Stages,
Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978), Greyhound was found to have attempted to run Mt. Hood
out of business by refusing to quote Mt. Hood's fares to potential interline passengers,
by arranging schedules that routed passengers around Mt. Hood's more direct bridge
service, by refusing to distribute Mt. Hood's schedules in Greyhound stations, and by
ending interline service with Mt. Hood. Because of the novel legal issues in the case, Mt.
Hood· did not recover damages for over a decade. Nonetheless, the treble-damage award ·
was $13.1 million, plus $1.25 million in attorneys' fees and costs.
229. See MAC DEREGULATION STUDY, supra note 20, et 20, 25-26.
230. ICC Florida Deregulation Report, supra note 177, at 3-9. See also Washington
Post, Dec. 26, 1980, et C6, col. 1; U.S. DEP'T OP TRANSPORTATION, DEREGULATION AND
INTERCITY Bus OPERATIONS IN FLoawA: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 67-69 (1981).
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business was a top priority. As America enters the 1980's, however, the challenges are double-digit inflation, a stagnant economy, and an uncertain world oil situation. These problems demand not stifling cartel regulation, but more competition,
greater productivity, and increased fuel conservation. Deregulation will not solve all the problems of the intercity bus industry;
it will not undo the business cycle or bring down the price of
fuel. Yet it will encourage competition by giving the bus industry new operating flexibility and new incentives to innovate,
thereby improving service to the travelling public.

